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THE ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS PROFILING
OF NONCITIZENS: NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Stephen H. Legomsky*
Abstract: In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the
United States has taken exceptional national security measures,
particularly with respect to noncitizens. Many of those measures either
expressly or at least arguably entail “proªling” young male Arabs and
Muslims. They are summarized in the ªrst section of this Article. The
next section offers an analytical framework for evaluating a proªling
program from a policy standpoint; it maintains that no proªling
practice is justiªed unless it satisªes certain minimum requirements of
rationality and weighted cost effectiveness. The ªnal section suggests
that some of the national security-related proªling practices raise
serious issues of U.S. compliance with its obligations under the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Introduction
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, United
States policymakers have sought new and more imaginative ways to pro-
tect national security and public safety. Many of the strategies operate
speciªcally on those who are not United States citizens. Primarily in the
immigration arena, these measures entail detention, intelligence-
gathering, expanding the substantive criteria for removing noncitizens,
contracting their procedural rights, tightening visa and other overseas
policies, and upgrading apprehensions and inspections at ports of entry.
Several such practices utilize what has come to be known as “pro-
ªling.” I shall use that term here to mean specially targeting individu-
als who possess identiªable attributes that are believed to bear positive
statistical correlations to particular kinds of misconduct—in this case,
involvement in terrorism.
                                                                                                                     
* Charles F. Nagel Professor of International Law, School of Law, Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis. I have beneªted from the superb research assistance of Stacie Powderly.
Much of the work on this Article was completed during a visiting appointment at the Uni-
versity of Cambridge, Center for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, to
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This sanitized deªnition makes “proªling” sound innocuous. But
the speciªc proªling attributes at issue here have included ethnicity,
country of nationality, religion, gender, and age. In practical terms,
people who appear to law enforcement ofªcials to be of Arab descent or
Muslim (or both) have been the most thoroughly scrutinized, especially
when they are also young and male. Are these practices a sensible policy
response to the threats posed by foreign terrorists? If so, are they legal?
Feeling obliged to disclose my personal biases, I shall say at the out-
set that I am opposed to ethnic and religious proªling, even in the pre-
sent national security context. My route to that conclusion differs some-
what from the road traveled by some other commentators, however, and
along the way I am prepared to concede perhaps more ground.
Section I of this Article summarizes the various national security-
related initiatives that the United States has undertaken in relation to
immigration speciªcally or non-U.S. citizens generally. Section II sug-
gests a framework for analyzing the policy tradeoffs that these various
proªling practices present. Section III considers whether current U.S.
proªling strategies comport with its obligations under the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (Race Convention).1
A few words of limitation: the United States is also a party to other,
more generic international human rights regimes that include, among
the many human rights they cover, prohibitions on speciªed forms of
discrimination.2 This Article does not explore the analogous issues that
                                                                                                                     
1 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter
Race Convention]. This Convention was ratiªed by the U.S. Senate on October 21, 1994 and
entered into force for the United States on November 20, 1994. See Louis Henkin et al.,
Human Rights Documentary Supplement 180 (2001) [hereinafter Henkin Doc. Supp.].
2 E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. This
Convention was ratiªed by the U. S. Senate on June 8, 1992 and entered into force for the
United States on September 8, 1992. See Henkin Doc. Supp., supra note 1, at 57. Article 26 of
the ICCPR guarantees equal protection of the law. ICCPR, supra, art. XXVI, 999 U.N.T.S. at
179. The United States is also a member of the Organization of American States (OAS). See
Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 48 n.1
(ratiªed by the United States on June 15, 1951), available at http://untreaty.un.org. As a
member of the OAS, the United States has committed itself to the principles of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, International Conference of
American States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc. OEA/ser. L./V./I.4 rev. (1948), reprinted in [1978]
Organization of American States, Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights
15, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 5. Article II of the Declaration guarantees
the right of equality before the law. Cf. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, arts. 1.1, 24, 27.1, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OAS/Ser. L/V/I.4 rev. 7, at 23
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these more generic instruments present, nor does it analyze the many
human rights treaties that the United States has not ratiªed, but which
also contain broadly worded anti-discrimination provisions.3 Finally, the
Article does not assess the compatibility of the current U.S. proªling
practices with domestic constitutional constraints.4
I. The Background: Immigration and National Security5
As the Introduction suggests, the United States’ efforts to combat
terrorism have been far-reaching, particularly with respect to immi-
gration policy and the general regulation of non-U.S. citizens. Em-
phasis here is placed upon the post-September 11 measures, but a few
preexisting programs are discussed as well.
A. The Preventive Detention of Noncitizens
Among the many immigration components of the U.S. national
security program, preventive detention has come to occupy center stage.
                                                                                                                     
(entered into force July 18, 1978). The United States has not ratiªed the Convention, but it is
possibly binding nonetheless. See Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 343 (1999).
3 E.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly Nov. 20,
1989, art. 2.1, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jan. 7–19,
1981, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. 59; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2.2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
4 For some excellent commentary on that subject, see, for example, David Cole, En-
emy Aliens (2003) [hereinafter Enemy Aliens book]; Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. John-
son, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs
and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 295, 327–55 (2003); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
Stan. L. Rev. 953 (2002) [hereinafter Enemy Aliens article]; Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y.
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Proªling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev.
651, 732–44 (2002) (considering both Fourth Amendment and equal protection limita-
tions); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Proªling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 Wash.
U. L.Q. 675, 680–96 (2000); Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigra-
tion Law: Citizenship and Race After September 11, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 871, 883–90 (2003); cf.
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1576–86 (2002) (relating
government-sponsored racial proªling to private sector hate crimes).
5 To avoid duplication and accommodate space constraints, this Section summarizes and
excerpts from my recent, more detailed description of the various immigration-related U.S.
national security initiatives, Stephen H. Legomsky, Supplement to Immigration and Refu-
gee Law and Policy, ch. 8A (2003). The reader is referred to the full version for additional
detail. See also Muzaffar A. Chishti et al., America’s Challenge: Domestic Security,
Civil Liberties, and National Unity After September 11 (2003) (providing an excellent
and comprehensive critique of post-September 11 developments); Donald Kerwin, Counterter-
rorism and Immigrant Rights Two Years Later, 80 Interpreter Releases 1401, 1401–07 (Oct. 13,
2003); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO
and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 Or. L. Rev. 1051, 1111–132 (2002).
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1. Detention in Connection with Removal Proceedings
During the months or years that removal proceedings often con-
sume, the government generally has the discretion to release the per-
son on bond if he or she will not endanger persons or property and is
likely to appear for the removal proceeding.6 By way of exception,
however, Congress has made detention mandatory when the removal
charge involves terrorism.7
Detention has also been made mandatory in certain asylum cases.
On March 18, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Secretary Tom Ridge announced an initiative called “Operation Lib-
erty Shield.” The initiative was accompanied by an administration list
of thirty-four countries designated as harboring terrorists. The list
consisted almost entirely of countries that are predominantly Arab,
Muslim, or both. Under one key provision of the short-lived Opera-
tion Liberty Shield, if a national of a listed country applied for asylum
at a U.S. port of entry but lacked valid entry documents—a common
condition for asylum seekers at ports of entry—detention was man-
dated until the person either received asylum or was removed.8
Apart from formal mandatory detention, national security con-
siderations have recently inºuenced discretionary detention deci-
sions. First, as elaborated upon in the next subsection, the FBI ar-
rested and interviewed hundreds of noncitizens in the months
following the September 11 attacks. Many arrested individuals were
believed to have violated immigration laws. In those cases, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted removal proceed-
ings, and the FBI routinely sent boilerplate memoranda to the Execu-
tive Ofªce for Immigration Review (EOIR) opposing discretionary
release on bond pending the removal decisions.9
                                                                                                                     
6 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1999); Aliens and
Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 236(c)(8) (2004).
7 INA § 236(c)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(D). The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of mandatory detention pending the removal of noncitizens on crime-
related grounds. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); see also Lee Hall, Nomads under the
Tent of Blue: Migrants Fuel the U.S. Prison Industry, Rutgers Race & L. Rev. (forthcoming
2004).
8 See DHS to Detain Asylum Seekers Under “Operation Liberty Shield”, 24 Refugee Reps. 5, 5
(Mar./Apr. 2003). Operation Liberty Shield lasted only one month; Secretary Ridge an-
nounced the program’s termination in his National Press Club Luncheon Address on
April 29, 2003. See Cole, Enemy Aliens book, supra note 4, at 51, 249 n.23.
9 See American Immigration Lawyers Association, Boiling the Frog Slowly: Executive Branch
Actions Since September 11, 2001, 7 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 1236, 1236–44 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Boiling the Frog Slowly].
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Second, when an immigration judge releases an individual on
bond, and the government appeals, the individual will be detained
while the appeal is pending.10 DHS need not demonstrate, or even
allege, any reasons for doubting the immigration judge’s decision to
release. As a result, simply by ªling an appeal to the BIA, the prosecut-
ing ofªcial can unilaterally effect the person’s conªnement for a pe-
riod of months or even years.11
2. The PENTTBOM Investigation
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the FBI, in coopera-
tion with several other law enforcement agencies, launched the Pen-
tagon/Twin Towers Bombing Investigation (PENTTBOM). Ofªcials
questioned and frequently detained individuals possibly involved in
the September 11 attacks or other terrorist activities, as well as anyone
who might have information of use to the investigation. Sometimes,
however, undocumented immigrants were encountered fortuitously
during the course of the investigation. Even if no link to, or knowl-
edge of, terrorism was suspected, they too were arrested, turned over
to the former INS and detained.12 Of the detainees held on immigra-
tion-related grounds (whether or not suspected of terrorism), the
overwhelming majority were males, between ages twenty-six and forty,
from Arab or Muslim countries. About one-third were from Pakistan.13
To compound the controversy, the government has steadfastly
refused to disclose to the public the names or whereabouts of the de-
tainees, a policy that the D.C. Circuit has upheld.14 In addition, a re-
cent federal Bureau of Prisons regulation rooted in the PENTTBOM
investigation authorized the monitoring of inmate-attorney conversa-
tions, sometimes with the inmate’s knowledge and sometimes without
                                                                                                                     
10 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(i)(2) (2002). In 2003, the INS and its functions were incorporated
into the DHS via the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 428,
116 Stat. 2135, 2187–89.
11 See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51
Emory L.J. 1003, 1030–31 (2002).
12 See Ofªce of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, The Septem-
ber 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks 69–70
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter OIG
Report].
13 See OIG Report, supra note 12, at 20–23.
14 See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 923, 933 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2003); Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After Septem-
ber 11? American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2002).
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it, in certain cases of suspected terrorism.15 The American Bar Asso-
ciation has been “deeply troubled” by these developments.16
3. The Certiªcation Program
The PATRIOT Act, enacted on October 26, 2001,17 requires the
Attorney General to “certify” and detain any noncitizen when there are
“reasonable grounds to believe” the person is either inadmissible or
deportable on certain national security-related grounds. Unlike the
general detention powers discussed in the preceding subsections, this
power expressly allows indeªnite detention as long as the case is re-
viewed at least once every six months.18 As of March 26, 2003, the
certiªcation provision had yet to be invoked,19 most likely because the
Department of Justice has found it simpler to detain noncitizens sus-
pected of terrorism either through the PENTTBOM program or
through its ordinary power to detain noncitizens during the course of
removal proceedings.
4. Detention of “Unlawful Combatants”
Approximately two months after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
President Bush, acting as Commander-in-Chief, issued a “Military Or-
der” that requires the detention—and military trial if criminal charges
are ªled—of noncitizens who the President has “reason to believe”:  (a)
are members of Al Qaeda; (b) are involved in speciªed ways in present
or potential future activities with “adverse effects on the United States,
its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy”; or (c) have
knowingly harbored any of the former individuals.20 The Order imposes
                                                                                                                     
15 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,066 (Oct. 31, 2001) (recently codiªed at 28 C.F.R.
§ 501.3(d) (2002)).
16 Angelo A. Paparelli & John C. Valdez, Never Say “i” (Unless You Must): Employment-
Based Options for Adjustment of Status That Avoid INA § 245(i), 78 Interpreter Releases
1733, 1743–44 (Nov. 12, 2001). For a contrary view, see Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable But
Insufªcient—Federal Initiatives in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 Conn. L. Rev.
1145, 1151–52 (2002) (arguing that preventing the deaths of thousands of innocent peo-
ple would justify monitoring the conversations of terrorists).
17 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.107–56,
§ 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350–52 (2001) (adding INA § 236A).
18 INA § 236A(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) (2004). For a strong critique, see Cole, su-
pra note 11, at 1026–28.
19 OIG Report, supra note 12, at 27–28 n.28.
20 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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no time limits on the detention.21 Its main use thus far has been for
Taliban and Al Qaeda ªghters captured in Afghanistan and ºown to the
U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba since January 10, 2002.22
B. Intelligence-Gathering
If nothing else, the events of September 11 have exposed deep
fault lines in the gathering, sharing, and use of intelligence data. In
the case of noncitizens, three parallel initiatives will soon be folded
into a comprehensive intelligence operation called US-VISIT. They
occupy the ªrst three subjects of this subsection. The fourth subsec-
tion elaborates upon the current status of the combined system. The
remaining subsections discuss other miscellaneous intelligence opera-
tions related to national security that speciªcally affect noncitizens.
1. The Automated Entry-Exit System
For many years, numerous observers bemoaned the United States
government’s failure to keep systematic records of all entries and de-
partures of noncitizens. The concerns, however, were rarely based on
national security; the notion was rather that without such records it
was impossible to identify, apprehend, and remove overstayers effec-
tively. In 1996, Congress gave the Attorney General two years to “de-
velop an automated entry and exit control system” that would require
the recording of every noncitizen’s entry into the United States, the
recording of every noncitizen’s departure, and a matching of the two
in order to identify all cases of overstay.23 There were strong and im-
mediate objections that recording the tens of millions of annual bor-
der crossings would cause horriªc congestion at border points and
would jeopardize trade.24 After various delays and reductions in scope
                                                                                                                     
21 Id.
22 See Daryl A. Mundis, Agora: Military Commissions: The Use of Military Commissions to
Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 Am. J. Int’l. L. 320, 320–21 (2002); Saito,
supra note 14, at 10–11. The Supreme Court has held that both citizen combatants de-
tained on the U.S. mainland and non-U.S. citizen combatants detained on Guantanamo
may use habeas corpus to assert certain procedural due process protections. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2643–52 (2004) (citizens); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696–
99 (2004) (noncitizens).
23 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–548 to 3009–549 (1996) (codiªed as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
24 See, e.g., Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, The Price of Tracking Overstays, 3
Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 179, 179–82 (1998).
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to assure proper implementation,25 urgency levels heightened sharply
with the September 11 attacks. In 2002, Congress set October 26, 2004
as the date by which the administration must implement an inte-
grated entry and exit data system; the same legislation speciªed the
technology standards, including use of biometric identiªers, that
Congress expected the system to incorporate.26
2. NSEERS
For decades, United States law has required almost all nonciti-
zens who are ages fourteen or over and who remain in the country
thirty days or more to register with designated authorities and to be
ªngerprinted; additionally, they must report any changes of address
to the immigration authorities within ten days of moving.27 Failure to
do so subjects them to both criminal prosecution and removal.28
Before September 11, the registration requirements were rarely
enforced. Few noncitizens were even aware of the requirements, and
the government made little attempt to publicize or enforce them. It
was widely felt that the practical beneªts of the information were out-
weighed by the administrative burdens and costs.
After September 11, priorities changed. On June 5, 2002, Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft announced the National Security Entry-
Exit Registration System (NSEERS).29 In 2002, on the ªrst anniversary
of September 11, this controversial program became applicable to
nearly all male nonimmigrants sixteen years of age or older who were
nationals of any of (by the end) twenty-ªve designated countries—
twenty-four Arab or other predominantly Muslim states and North
Korea—as well as any individual nonimmigrants who otherwise pre-
sented national security or law enforcement concerns. The affected
persons were ªngerprinted and photographed at the ports of entry
and, if they remained more than thirty days, were required to report
                                                                                                                     
25 See Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of
2000, Pub. L. No.106–215, 114 Stat. 337, 337–42 (2000); Omnibus Consolidated and Emer-
gency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105–277, tit. XIII, § 116, 112
Stat. 2681, 2681–88 (1998).
26 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVERA), Pub. L.
No. 107–173, §§ 302, 303, 116 Stat. 543, 552–54 (2002).
27 INA §§ 262, 265(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1305(a) (1999).
28 INA §§ 237(a)(3)(A), 266(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(3)(A), 1306(b) (1999).
29 See Registering and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,581,
40,548–86 (proposed June 13, 2002) (to be codiªed at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214, 264); Registering
and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,584, 52,584–93 (Aug. 12,
2002) (to be codiªed at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214(f), 264.1(f)).
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periodically to DHS with additional information. At the time of this
writing, the registration deadline for the last groups subject to
NSEERS was April 25, 2003. Because the government intends to fold
NSEERS into a new and more comprehensive program (US-VISIT,
described below), it appears there will be no more special call-in an-
nouncements for entire countries; rather, future call-ins are likely to
be individualized.30
As of June 7, 2003, approximately 16 percent of the 82,000 males
required to register had been subjected to removal proceedings, in
almost all cases because of immigration status violations. Many of
those removed were individuals awaiting priority dates for family re-
uniªcation; they had often assumed mistakenly that their cooperation
in appearing for registration would not precipitate removal proceed-
ings. The 82,000 special registrations, combined with the tens of thou-
sands of additional registrations at ports of entry, have, thus far,
yielded only eleven terrorism suspects.31
3. SEVIS and Other Student-Related Programs32
For reasons that have never been entirely clear, even before Sep-
tember 11 Congress’s concerns about foreign terrorism have focused
exceptional attention on foreign students, as distinguished from other
nonimmigrant visitors. In 1996, Congress required the Attorney Gen-
eral, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to collect individual-
ized information from colleges and universities on every enrolled for-
eign student. An institution that failed to provide the required
information would be barred from further enrollment of foreign stu-
dents.33 Following September 11, Congress expanded the required in-
formation and demanded prompt implementation.34 It simultaneously
authorized schools to disclose individual student records to designated
government ofªcials pursuant to ex parte court orders issued on suspi-
                                                                                                                     
30 Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 264. See generally Howard W. Gordon & Nancy H.
Morawetz, Special Registration: A Nightmare for Foreign Visitors, Immigr. L. Today, Mar./Apr.
2003, at 42, 44.
31 See Rachel L. Swarns, More Than 13,000 May Face Deportation, N.Y. Times, June 7,
2003, at A1.
32 See generally Susan N. Burgess, SEVIS: Is It Academic?, Immigr. Brieªngs 1, 1-25 (Feb.
2004); Victor C. Romero, Noncitizen Students and Immigration Policy Post-9/11, 17 Geo. Im-
migr. L.J. 357, 357–66 (2003).
33 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–704 to 3009–707 (1996)
(codiªed as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
34 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 416, 115 Stat. 272, 354–55 (2001).
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cion of terrorism.35 In addition, immediately after the attacks, the FBI
began asking schools for information on their foreign students. The
schools typically complied, even absent the court orders required by
the new law.36 In 2002, Congress required the collection of additional
information and mandated that the system be electronic.37
SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System) is the
name of the government-designed electronic system intended to sat-
isfy the various statutory requirements.38 This Internet-based system
stores the required data on foreign students and permits the transmis-
sion of the data, both among the relevant government agencies and
between the agencies and the schools. It became fully operative, albeit
with controversial technical glitches, on August 1, 2003.39
4. US-VISIT
On April 29, 2003, Secretary Ridge announced a new initiative
called the United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indication
Technology System (US-VISIT). It is designed to integrate the entry-
exit, NSEERS, and SEVIS programs into a single comprehensive elec-
tronic data system to monitor nonimmigrants. When it is fully opera-
tional (currently projected to be the end of 2005), all nonimmigrants
who enter the United States, other than those tourists and business
visitors who enter under the visa waiver program for nationals of se-
lected countries, will encounter US-VISIT upon entry. Their
ªngerprints and digital photographs will be taken, and their travel
documents scanned. Iris scanners might also be employed. The goal is
to use biometric identiªers to create an “electronic check in/check
out system” that can be used not only for national security purposes,
but also for locating visa violators. When the visitors leave the country,
DHS will verify their identities once more and input the departure
information into the database.40 That information will then be avail-
                                                                                                                     
35 Id. § 507.
36 See Romero, supra note 32, at 358.
37 EBSVERA, Pub. L. No. 107–173, § 501, 116 Stat. 543, 560–62 (2002).
38 Retention and Reporting of Information for F, J, and M Nonimmigrants; Student
and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), 67 Fed. Reg. 76,256, 76,256 (Dec. 11,
2002).
39 See Jan H. Brown, The Immigration Alphabet, Immigr. L. Today, May/June 2003, at 49.
40 See generally Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigration Status In-
dicator Technology Program (“US-VISIT”) Biometric Requirements, 69 Fed. Reg. 468
( Jan. 5, 2004); David B. Pakula & Lawrence P. Lataif, Judicial Review of BCIS Decisions: Will
There Be Any?, 80 Interpreter Releases 677, 690 (May 12, 2003); DHS to Launch “US-
VISIT” System to Replace NSEERS, 8 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 966, 966–67 (2003).
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able to inspectors at ports of entry, special agents and adjudications
staff at DHS, U.S. consulates, and other law enforcement agencies.41
5. Voluntary Interviews of Noncitizens
Yet another response to the events of September 11, 2001 was a
massive Department of Justice scheme to interview thousands of non-
citizens who might have information on potential terrorist activities.
The idea was to talk with people whose demographics and immigra-
tion statuses resembled those of the nineteen hijackers. The inter-
views were purportedly voluntary, and the interviewees were to be re-
garded as potential sources of information, not as suspects. The
project was coordinated by the Department of Justice’s Executive
Ofªce for United States Attorneys (EOUSA).
There were two rounds of interviews, including a cross-section of
male nonimmigrants ranging in age from approximately seventeen to
forty-seven, who had entered the United States between January 1,
2000 and February 27, 2002 and were nationals of any of twenty-six
countries where Al Qaeda was thought to have a strong presence.
Roughly 3,200 people were interviewed. Some of the questions elic-
ited personal information about the interviewee (e.g., employment,
education level, whether the person has ever visited Afghanistan,
etc.), while others focused on whether the interviewee had knowledge
of suspicious persons or activities. Despite their invasive nature, there
seems to be a consensus that the interviews were conducted respect-
fully and professionally.42
The program was controversial, for at least two reasons. First, al-
though no evidence indicates anyone was coerced to participate, inter-
viewees did not always perceive the conversations to be truly voluntary.
They often reported that they “feared there could be [immigration-
related] repercussions to them for declining to participate.”43 Second,
since the overwhelming majority of the interviewees were Muslim, of
Arab origin, or both, interviewees often felt “singled out and investi-
                                                                                                                     
41 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: US-VISIT Program (May
19, 2003), reprinted in 8 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 984, 984–85 (2003).
42 See U.S. General Accounting Ofªce, Report to Congressional Committees,
Homeland Security: Justice Department’s Project to Interview Aliens after Sep-
tember 11, 2001 8 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03459.pdf [here-
inafter GAO Report]; Boiling the Frog Slowly, supra note 9, at 1240; The Aftermath of September
11: A Chronology, 79 Interpreter Releases 1359, 1360 (Nov. 9, 2002). The questions were
pre-formulated and are reproduced in the GAO Report, supra, app. I at 21–27.
43 GAO Report, supra note 42, at 8–9.
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gated because of their ethnicity or religious beliefs,” according to im-
migration advocates and attorneys who sat in on interviews.44
A separate interviewing program commenced one year later. In
2003, in connection with the then-impending Iraq War, the FBI inter-
viewed approximately 2,000 Iraqi nationals living in the United States.
That program gave rise to many of the same issues.45
6. “Snitch” Visas and the “Responsible Cooperator” Program
Shortly after the September 11 attacks, Congress made perma-
nent a previously expired temporary program that authorized non-
immigrant visas for individuals who share or have shared “critical reli-
able information” about a “terrorist organization.”46 Up to ªfty of
these so-called “S-6” visas may be issued each year.47
On November 29, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft launched the
“Responsible Cooperators Program,” in which he ofªcially encour-
aged various Department of Justice personnel to make liberal use of S-
visas in “appropriate cases.” In those instances in which a person who
is willing to share important terrorism-related information is ineligi-
ble for an S-visa, the Attorney General urged ofªcials to consider pa-
role or deferred action as an incentive to cooperate.48 The American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee has expressed the concern that
these programs would make members of the Arab-American commu-
nity suspicious of one another.49
C. Expansion of Removal Grounds
Post-September 11 legislation has expanded retroactively the range
of terrorism-related activities or associations that trigger inadmissibility
or deportability.50 In addition, the Secretary of State has designated
many new organizations as “foreign terrorist organizations;” the legal
consequence is that members of such organizations are subject to re-
                                                                                                                     
44 Id. at 16–17.
45 Pakula & Lataif, supra note 40, at 693–94.
46 Pub. L. No. 107–45, 115 Stat. 258 (2001) (amending INA § 101(a)(15)(S)).
47 INA § 214(k)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(k)(1).
48 See DOJ Order Incentives: ‘Voluntary’ Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists; For-
eign Students, Visa Processing Under State Dept. Scrutiny, 78 Interpreter Releases 1816,
1816–17 (Dec. 3, 2001).
49 Id. at 1817.
50 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 411, 115 Stat. 272, 345–50 (2001),
(amending INA § 212(a)(3)(B) for inadmissibility grounds). The deportability grounds
are analogous. INA § 237(a)(4)(B), U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
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moval without proof that they knew or even should have known of the
organization’s terrorist activities.51
D. Contracting Procedural Rights
Several provisions of U.S. law, some of them predating September
11, permit executive ofªcials to bypass the usual procedural safe-
guards in certain national security cases.
1. Arriving Noncitizens
Under INA § 235(c), an immigration ofªcer or immigration
judge who suspects that an arriving noncitizen is inadmissible on any
of several speciªed national-security-related grounds (including ter-
rorism) is required to order the person removed and to report the
removal to the Attorney General. If the Attorney General concludes
from conªdential information that the person is inadmissible on any
of the designated grounds, and that disclosure of that information
“would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security,” then
the noncitizen may be removed without a hearing.
2. The Terrorist Removal Court
One year after the 1995 bombing of the federal building in
Oklahoma City by domestic terrorists, Congress established a special
“removal court” for removing alleged foreign terrorists. The court is
available when the government’s case rests on classiªed information
that the government feels it cannot safely disclose. The details of the
statutory scheme appear elsewhere.52 As of this writing, the govern-
ment has yet to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.
3. Closed Removal Hearings
In the days following the September 11 attacks, the Department of
Justice identiªed a number of noncitizens who, it believed, either were
connected to terrorist activities or had information useful to the gov-
ernment investigation of terrorism. These were designated as “special
interest” cases. On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Mi-
                                                                                                                     
51 See INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(v), 212(a)(3)(B)(vi), 219; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(v),
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi), 1189; Boiling the Frog Slowly, supra note 9, at 1237.
52 Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 843–46 (3d
ed. 2002); Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation
Proceedings, 7 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 23, 25–26 (1996).
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chael Creppy sent a memorandum to all the immigration judges in-
structing them to close to the public all removal hearings held in such
cases. There could be “no visitors, no family, and no press.”53 The direc-
tive also ordered the immigration judges not to discuss the cases or dis-
close any information about them to anyone outside the immigration
courts. It barred the judges even from “conªrming or denying whether
such a case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing.”54 As of May 8,
2003, closed removal hearings had been conducted in 641 cases; no
future closed hearings were scheduled.55 Two courts of appeals have
divided over whether, by denying media access to the proceedings, the
Creppy directive violates freedom of the press.56
4. Secret Evidence Hearings
INA § 240(b)(4)(B) allows the government to use secret “national
security” information either to oppose an individual’s admission to the
United States57 or, more importantly, to oppose his or her application
for discretionary relief even in the deportation setting. Over the years,
both courts and commentators have questioned the procedural fairness
of secret evidence removal hearings, with some courts holding that the
practice violates due process, at least insofar as it excludes even in cam-
era evidence.58 Of particular relevance is the secret procedure’s poten-
tial and realized capacity to be applied disproportionately to Muslims
and to individuals of Arab descent or appearance.59
                                                                                                                     
53 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting the
Creppy Directive).
54 Id. at 202–03.
55 Pakula, supra note 40, at 692–93 (testimony of Kevin Rooney, Director of EOIR, be-
fore Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, Comm. on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives).
56 Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 707–710 (6th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing Creppy directive unconstitutional), with N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 201–02 (up-
holding directive). See generally Ting, supra note 16, at 1156.
57 See discussion of INA § 235(b) supra Part I.D.1.
58 See, e.g., Niels W. Frenzen, National Security and Procedural Fairness: Secret Evidence and
the Immigration Laws, 76 Interpreter Releases 1677, 1682–83 (Nov. 22, 1999); David A.
Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zad-
vydas v. Davis, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 127 n.202. In a post-September 11 decision, Singh v.
INS, the court avoided the constitutional question by interpreting the statute to require at
least in camera review of the government’s evidence. 328 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2003). For
excellent commentary, see Frenzen, supra; Martin, supra; Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade
Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 51 (1999).
59 See Akram, supra note 58, at 52–53; Frenzen, supra note 58, at 1683–85.
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E. Visas and Other Overseas Policies
The aftermath of September 11 included intense public concern
about the adequacy of the visa system as a device for detecting dan-
gerous individuals before they reach U.S. territory. The principal
challenge lay in how best to reconcile critical U.S. national security
requirements with the need for openness to tourists, students, busi-
ness travelers, and other visitors who apply for visas and enter the
country by the tens of millions every year. The following are a few of
the overseas programs that resulted.
1. Country-Speciªc Strategies
In May of 2002, Congress prohibited the issuance of nonimmi-
grant visas to any noncitizen who is “from a country that is a state
sponsor of international terrorism unless the Secretary of State de-
termines, in consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of
other appropriate United States agencies, that such alien does not
pose a threat to the safety or national security of the United States.”60
For purposes of this requirement, a “state sponsor of international
terrorism” is any state whose government has already been so classi-
ªed for other purposes under any of several existing laws.61
By May of 2003, the State Department had designated seven
countries as state sponsors of international terrorism—ªve Arab
states, North Korea, and Cuba.62 Before a consular ofªcer can  issue a
visa, an applicant from one of the designated countries must com-
plete substantial additional paperwork and receive a “Visas Condor”
clearance, which entails an intense security check by federal intelli-
gence agencies. According to one senior visa ofªcer at an overseas
consular post, the resulting delays average three to four weeks, but
“many others . . . can run into months.”63 The same ofªcer explained
that the statutory phrase “from a country” has been interpreted to
cover anyone born in that country, whether or not still a national of
that country.64 Thus, for example, a person who left the country as a
                                                                                                                     
60 EBSVERA, Pub. L. No. 107–173, § 306(a), 116 Stat. 543, 555 (2002).
61 Id. § 306(b).
62 See Victor C. Romero, Decoupling “Terrorist” from “Immigrant”: An Enhanced Role for the
Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. of Gender, Race & Just. 101, 102 n.3 (2003); Liam Schwartz
& Michelle L. Lazerow, The Consul and the Visas Condor—Closely Scrutinizing, Immigr. L.
Today, May/June 2003, at 24.
63 Schwartz & Lazerow, supra note 62, at 24–26.
64 Id. (emphasis added).
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small child and has lived in the West ever since would be subject to
the same delays.
2. Injecting DHS into the Visa Process
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 left visa applications in the
hands of the State Department’s consular ofªcers, but, as an added
safeguard, Congress introduced DHS into the process.65 The Secre-
tary of Homeland Security now has the authority to issue regulations
about, and to oversee, the visa work of the consular ofªcers.66 The
Secretary may also prevent issuance of a visa but may not reverse a
consular ofªcer’s decision to refuse one.67 In addition, the Secretary
may station DHS employees at the consulates to review individual visa
applications, to perform investigations, and to advise and train consu-
lar ofªcers on issues of national security.68
3. Heightened Scrutiny and Delay
Elevated security precautions have caused long and controversial
delays in visa issuance, especially—but not exclusively—for students.
Visa investigations now require a good deal of additional information.69
Moreover, until August 1, 2003, interviews were not required for
most applicants for B-2 tourist visas and certain other visa categories.
A State Department interim regulation now requires such interviews
for all nonimmigrant applicants except those who fall within any of
six narrowly deªned groups, including young children, persons age
sixty or older, and other miscellaneous categories.70
F. Enhanced Border Enforcement
In addition to the overseas enforcement initiatives just discussed,
a series of steps have intensiªed the scrutiny of arriving travelers at
land borders, airports, and seaports. These steps include increased
                                                                                                                     
65 HSA, Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 428, 116 Stat. 2135, 2187–89.
66 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1) (Supp. 2004).
67 Id.
68 Id. § 236(e).
69 See EBSVERA, Pub. L. No. 107–173, §501(b), 116 Stat. 543 (2002); see also Foreign
Students and Scholars in the Age of Terrorism: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, 108th
Cong. (2003)(statement of Shirley M. Tilghman, President, Princeton University), reprinted
in 8 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 714, 714–19 (2003) (discussing the increasing difªculty of
obtaining student visas).
70 Documentation of Nonimmigrants Under the Immigrant and Nationality Act, 68 Fed. Reg.
40,127, 40,127–29 ( July 7, 2003) (to be codiªed at 22 C.F.R. § 41.102).
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funding for additional immigration inspectors, investigators, and sup-
port staffs, improved training, and new technologies,71 as well as re-
quiring “passenger manifests,” which contain certain prescribed de-
tails about each arriving passenger and crew member.72
G. Summary
For purposes of both the policy analysis in the next section and the
Race Convention analysis in Section III, there are at least two ways to
classify the national security initiatives discussed above. First, they can
be classiªed on the basis of the groups of individuals on whom they op-
erate. Thus, some of the programs apply only to nationals of select
countries or, in one variant, to individuals who were born in select
countries. Other programs, in contrast, apply to all noncitizens who
exhibit particular behaviors, often with systematically different practical
effects on nationals, natives, or descendants of particular countries.
Second, the programs can be classiªed according to the individual in-
terest affected or the resultant deprivations or level of intrusion. Some
deprivations, such as detention, denial of a visa, or removal from the
United States, are potentially quite serious because the effects can be
highly invasive, long-lasting, or both. Others, such as closed removal
hearings and secret evidence removal hearings, implicate the loss of
procedural safeguards that are meant to reduce the risk of erroneous
substantive deprivations. Still others, particularly those aimed at gather-
ing intelligence, can involve anything ranging from minor inconven-
iences to costly delays, signiªcant disruption, or loss of privacy.
II. The Policy Tradeoffs: Proªling, Rationality, and Balance
The Introduction deªnes “proªling” as “specially targeting indi-
viduals who possess identiªable attributes that are believed to bear a
positive statistical correlation to particular kinds of misconduct—in this
case, involvement in terrorism.”73 Thus, customs ofªcials have long
made productive use of drug smuggler proªles based on appearances
or habits. When investigating serial killings and serial rapes, police of-
ten employ proªles. So long as we live in a world where law enforce-
ment resources are ªnite and the experts have good reason to believe
that certain criminal behaviors tend to be disproportionately present in
                                                                                                                     
71 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 402–403, 115 Stat. 272; EBSVERA,
Pub. L. No. 107–173, §§ 101–02, 116 Stat. 543, 555 (2002).
72 EBSVERA, Pub. L. No. 107–173, § 402, 116 Stat. 543, 555 (2002).
73 See supra Introduction.
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a discrete identiªable group, proªling seems rational. Credible statistics
and probabilities can enhance the efªcient deployment of scarce law
enforcement resources.74
The problems arise when the proªling attributes include race, eth-
nicity, religion, gender, or other disfavored forms of discrimination.
First, since proªling is premised on the notion that it is a rational way to
allocate limited administrative or enforcement resources, the proªling is
irrational if the particular attributes fail to accurately predict criminal
conduct. Proªling is indefensible when its criteria are nothing more
than the product of irrational prejudice. Because the proªling attributes
discussed here coincide with popular prejudices toward Arabs and Mus-
lims, there is cause to scrutinize their rationality with particular care.
Second, even when solid empirical evidence substantiates the as-
sumed correlation between the proªle and the criminal conduct, “ra-
tional” does not necessarily mean “justiªed.” A balancing is required.
On one side of the ledger are the perceived gains in national security
from the government’s efªcient use of limited law enforcement re-
sources. On the other side are the considerable harms associated with
government-sponsored discrimination.
In recent years, much has been done to expose the systematic po-
lice practice of targeting African-American motorists for vehicle
stops.75 The phrases “driving while black” and, more recently, “driving
while Latino” have made their way into our vocabulary.76
Since September 11, 2001, Congress, the executive departments,
and federal agents who are engaged in both terrorism investigations
and garden-variety immigration enforcement have become increas-
ingly prone to target individuals thought to be Arab, Muslim, or na-
tionals of Arab or Muslim countries.77 The expression “ºying while
Arab” has crept into our vocabulary.
                                                                                                                     
74 This is a recurring theme in the sophisticated analysis of Frederick Schauer. See Fre-
derick Schauer, Proªles, Probabilities and Stereotypes 1–7 (2003) (describing
beneªts of, but nonetheless resistance to, policies that rely on actuarial generalizations).
75 For a particularly rigorous empirical study, see generally Gross & Barnes, supra note
4. Other ªne analyses include: David A. Harris, Proªles in Injustice: Why Racial
Proªling Cannot Work (2002); David A. Harris, ACLU Special Report: Driving
While Black: Racial Proªling on Our Nation’s Highways ( June 1999), at http://ar-
chive.aclu.org/proªling/report; Jeremiah W. (“Jay”) Nixon, Remarks on Racial Proªling in
Missouri, 22 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 53 (2003); Leland Ware, Prohibiting Racial Proªling:
The ACLU’s Orchestration of the Missouri Legislation, 22 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 59 (2003).
76 Johnson, supra note 4, at 681–82; Victor C. Romero, Racial Proªling: “Driving While
Mexican” and Afªrmative Action, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 195, 195–97 (2000).
77 See supra Section I.
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Several distinct types of proªling should be distinguished.
Ofªcials might consciously and explicitly target people who appear to
be Muslim or of Arab descent. The same practical results can occur
indirectly, or de facto, as the byproducts of proªling on the basis of
some third attribute that correlates positively with race or religion.
Thus, policymakers or law enforcement agents might target nationals
or natives of those countries that are predesignated as harboring ter-
rorists. Many of the post-September 11 federal programs utilize that
form of proªling; the populations of the listed countries are over-
whelmingly Arab or Muslim or both.78
There are special reasons to scrutinize even the latter forms of
proªling. First, proponents might well use country of nationality or
birth as a pretext for ethnic or religious discrimination. Second, even
when the architects of the program sincerely desire to focus on gov-
ernments rather than ethnic or religious groups, or to proceed solely
on the basis of statistical correlations between terrorism and particu-
lar countries of nationality or birth, such practices have obvious dispa-
rate impacts on Arabs and Muslims. Fair and responsible solutions to
the legal and policy problems must take that negative consequence
into account.
Some of these programs superimpose two other proªling attrib-
utes—gender and age. An example would be any strategy that targets
male nationals of particular countries who fall within a prescribed age
range.79
My view is that law enforcement proªling is justiªable only when
two conditions are met. First, the practice must be rational. At a mini-
mum, this means that the particular proªling attributes must correlate
positively with the relevant danger or misconduct, so that their use will
increase the probability of detection. Second, any gains in the efªcacy
or efªciency of the inspection process must be balanced against the
substantial harms of government-sponsored discrimination. Since the
present discussion implicates policy rather than constitutionality, read-
ers can decide for themselves the relative weights that these competing
interests should command. Certainly, however, by analogy to settled
constitutional traditions, the weight assigned to the harmful effects of
government-sponsored discrimination should increase when, as is the
case with many of the current practices, the bases for special targeting
are race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and the like.
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79 See supra Sections I.B.2, I.B.5.
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Do the national security-related proªling practices discussed here
meet those two conditions?
A. Rationality
David Cole is one of the leading critics of government programs
that target the Arab and Muslim communities. In his groundbreaking
article, Enemy Aliens,80 he questions whether the recent spate of pro-
ªle-based counter-terrorism initiatives is even effective. He ªrst ob-
serves that effective law enforcement requires the cooperation of local
communities. In his view, it makes more long-term sense to work con-
structively with those communities than to alienate them through
stereotypes and special targeting. He would apply the same principle
on the international plane. To ªght terrorism, he argues, the United
States sorely needs the cooperation of the Arab and Muslim states;
antagonizing them by targeting their nationals is counterproductive.81
Up to that point, I am largely in agreement. Professor Cole goes
on, however, to deny the effectiveness of ethnic proªling in other ways.
He argues that the proªling programs are poorly tailored to their na-
tional security objectives. In particular, he suggests that the vast majority
of people who appear Arab or Muslim—he estimates 99.9%—have no
involvement with terrorism at all, and therefore that Arab or Muslim
appearance is a hopelessly inaccurate proxy for terrorism.82
This is where I must respectfully part company. By the reasoning
used, no one should be questioned or inspected—even when boarding
a plane—unless there is something suspicious about that speciªc indi-
vidual. After all, only the most minute proportion of air travelers
wants to bring down the plane.
The fallacy is in looking at the wrong percentage. Certainly, I
agree that only a minuscule percentage of noncitizens who appear to
be Arab or Muslim are involved in any way with terrorism. But that is
not the point. The more relevant ªgure, I maintain, is the converse—
the percentage of those noncitizens involved in terrorism who are
Arab or Muslim. If there is credible evidence that this percentage is
higher in this subgroup than in the general population, then it seems
                                                                                                                     
80 Cole, Enemy Aliens article, supra note 4, at 976–77. This article was later expanded
into a book, Cole, Enemy Aliens book, supra note 4, at 183–208.
81 Cole, Enemy Aliens article, supra note 4, at 958–59; Cole, Enemy Aliens book, supra
note 4, at 9–10.
82 Cole, Enemy Aliens article, supra note 4, at 976; Cole, Enemy Aliens book, supra note
4, at 55. Although his argument is constitutional, its logic is equally relevant to the present
policy analysis.
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rational for the government to focus particular attention on that
group.83 It is simply a matter of channeling inspection resources to
places where they are statistically most likely to detect real terrorists.
Professor Cole also offers the following argument: by treating an
entire group of people as “presumptively suspicious,” agents are likely
to miss the truly dangerous types who don’t ªt the proªle. He gives the
example of the British shoe bomber, Richard Reid.84
Again, I respectfully disagree. The government does not have the
resources to scrutinize everyone with the rigor that would be required
to ferret out all terrorists. At the other extreme, no responsible gov-
ernment could decide not to scrutinize anyone. That leaves only one
other possibility: the government must be selective. But selectivity re-
quires another decision. Either the government selects people ran-
domly, or it selects people based on attributes that it thinks correlate
positively with terrorist involvement. Either option has the unavoid-
able disadvantage that Professor Cole identiªes—that the government
will overlook a certain number of terrorists—but the latter option at
least mitigates that risk.
Lastly, he argues, since the vast majority of the targeted popula-
tion will prove to be innocent, agents relying on these proªles will in-
evitably let their guard down. In this way, “overbroad ethnic generali-
zations . . . may actually undermine effectiveness.”85 Yet that problem
would be even greater without proªling. Unless the proportion of ter-
rorists that the government would encounter through random sam-
pling (or even nonrandom sampling that avoids ethnicity and relig-
ion) is higher than the proportion of terrorists in the Arab and
Muslim sample, then the problem of ofªcers letting their guard down
because the sampled population is overwhelmingly innocent would
be even greater without the ethnic and religious proªling. On the is-
sue of rationality, the real question is whether a positive correlation
                                                                                                                     
83 I emphasize “if,” though few would dispute that, at a minimum, the ranks of Al
Qaeda are overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim. See Nixon, supra note 75, at 56. In the words
of Missouri’s Attorney General, “[i]t would be foolish not to acknowledge the fact that Al
Queda speciªcally targeted young, Islamic men from Middle Eastern countries to train as
terrorists.” Id.
84 Cole, Enemy Aliens article, supra note 4, at 976; Cole, Enemy Aliens book, supra note
4, at 55. In December of 2001, Reid tried to destroy a passenger plane by igniting explo-
sives hidden in the lining of his shoes. See Alan Levin, Terrorists Could Bring Down U.S. Jets
With Hidden Bombs; Despite New Security Steps, Explosives Evade Screening, USA Today, Sept. 29,
2004, at A1.
85 Cole, Enemy Aliens article, supra note 4, at 976–77; Cole, Enemy Aliens book, supra
note 4, at 55–56.
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exists between terrorism and the attributes the government employs
in its proªles. If there is not, then all can agree the proªling is irra-
tional; if there is, however, the practice seems rational.
For all the above reasons, it is perilous to rest the case against eth-
nic and religious proªling in the context of national security on claims
that the correlation between the targeted population and the feared
misconduct is too minimal. Such claims require a demonstration that
those foreign terrorists who seriously contemplate inºicting harm on
the United States are not disproportionately Arab or Muslim. In my
view, the more convincing arguments against the current proªling
practices are those that recognize that “rational” does not mean
“justiªable.” The countervailing social harms inherent in government-
sponsored discrimination are the subject of the next subsection.
One other qualiªcation is necessary. As Leila Sadat has noted,86
many of the current proªling practices crudely lump together people
of “Arab” ethnicity when more nuanced distinctions are available and
useful. Not all Arab nations possess identical policies or cultures, and
not all Arab populations share common ideologies. It follows that not
all nationals, natives, or descendants of all predominantly Arab coun-
tries—much less all nationals, natives or descendants of all countries
that are predominantly either Arab or Muslim—can be gainfully ag-
gregated. The larger point is a more general one. In evaluating a par-
ticular proªling practice, one might ªnd it “irrational” to aggregate
dissimilar groups when more reªned breakdowns that consider rele-
vant distinguishing features are attainable at costs that are reasonable
in relation to the beneªts. Nonetheless, this Article will employ a less
demanding deªnition of “rational”—one that is satisªed so long as
the proªling criteria positively correlate to the relevant danger or
misconduct. Although the practice might not be optimal, as the mag-
nitude of the positive correlation could be increased by adopting
ªner distinctions at reasonable data collection costs, this fact does not
disturb what I am calling the rationality of the practice. Since the lack
of optimal precision diminishes law enforcement gains and increases
law enforcement costs, however, it does enter the equation during the
second, cost-beneªt phase.
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50 Wayne L. Rev. 1 (forthcoming 2004).
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B. Balancing National Security and Civil Rights
The importance of national security in our post-September 11
world is self-evident. If the kinds of ethnic and religious proªling in
use today truly yield substantial national security beneªts—and
whether they do should be determined through the framework sug-
gested above—then such proªling cannot be dismissed as irrational.
Again, however, even if that is the case, “rational” does not necessarily
mean “justiªable.”87 The harms that ºow from government-sponsored
discrimination are perhaps equally self-evident. A few of those harms
are nonetheless worth emphasizing.
They fall into two categories. In the ªrst category are those harms
associated with particular substantive deprivations: the person’s re-
moval, detention, arrest, questioning, registration, prosecution, and
so forth. Second are those harms associated with the discrimination
itself. These includes not only the core injustice of being treated less
favorably than others for inadequate reasons, but also personal feel-
ings of humiliation, unfair treatment, a loss of dignity, a loss of
conªdence, and the sense of being seen and treated as an outsider.
These harms have been eloquently articulated in the literature.88
Some might feel that the harmful consequences of discrimina-
tion should be discounted when, as is true of most of the practices
discussed here, the proªled population consists almost entirely of
non-U.S. citizens. The targeted group might, for example, consist only
of those non-U.S. citizens who are nationals of designated foreign
countries, of Arab descent, or Muslim. Or it might consist of subcate-
gories of those groups, deªned by gender and age.
That too is an issue on which opinion is divided. To the extent that
noncitizens are thought of as mere guests, rather than full members of
                                                                                                                     
87 For an analogous balancing of the beneªts and costs in the motorist context, see
Gross & Barnes, supra note 4, at 744–53.
88 For just a small sampling, see, for example, Juan F. Perea, et al., Immigrants Out!
The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States ( Juan F.
Perea ed., 1997); Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978); Leti Volpp, “Obnoxious to their
Very Nature”: Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 5 Citizenship Stud. 57 (2001);
Susan Musarrat Akram, Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claims, 12 Int’l J. Refu-
gee L. 7 (2000); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity, 19 Chicano-Latino L.
Rev. 197 (1998); Victor C. Romero, Broadening Our World: Citizens and Immigrants of Color in
America, 27 Cap. U. L. Rev. 13 (1998); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizen-
ship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 Oreg. L. Rev. 261 (1997); Berta
Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the
Twenty-First Century, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1075 (1996); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles,
My Grandfather’s Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34
St. Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990).
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the national political community, their interests might be seen as de-
serving less weight relative to national security needs. And if the gov-
ernment perceives that the particular ethnic subcategory of noncitizens
is deriving terrorist-related support from the country or countries of
origin, then the sensitive foreign policy concerns might prompt some
observers to say the U.S. government should have greater latitude than
in a purely domestic context.89 Moreover, as Professor David Martin has
long argued, it might be that within the class of noncitizens the content
of one’s due process rights (and perhaps other constitutional rights)
should vary with the differing levels of membership that our immigra-
tion laws implicitly assign.90 Others might feel, however, that racial dis-
crimination is racial discrimination, and that it is no more acceptable
simply because its victims are not U.S. nationals.
One of the trickier variables is the way the proªling attributes are
formally articulated. Suppose, as is true of some of the strategies de-
scribed earlier, that the targeted group of noncitizens is deªned by
country of nationality or of birth, not by ethnicity or religion.91 An
example would be any policy that singles out nationals of those coun-
tries that the President has designated as harboring terrorists. From a
policy standpoint, is anything wrong with such criteria? After all, the
United States has several other country-speciªc immigration pro-
grams—a visa waiver program for certain nationals of certain coun-
tries,92 the special border-crossing privileges for certain Canadian and
Mexican nationals under NAFTA,93 and the per-country numerical
ceilings on the admission of immigrants,94 to name a few. Some might
say this policy is no different.
                                                                                                                     
89 Elsewhere, I have explored the full range of rationales offered by the Supreme
Court for the principle that special judicial deference is due when noncitizens challenge
the constitutionality of federal immigration legislation. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immi-
gration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America, 172–222
(1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255. These two writings are updated in Stephen H. Legomsky,
Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 925 (1995).
90 Martin, supra note 58, at 84–109; David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the
National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 165, 208–24 (1983).
91 See supra Section I.
92 INA § 217, 8 U.S.C. § 1187.
93 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican
States ( Jan. 1, 1994); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103–182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
94 INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152.
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Thus, by basing its differential treatment on country of national-
ity rather than on ethnicity or religion, the government at the very
least puts its policy on more respectable footing. Assuming that coun-
tries that harbor terrorists are inclined to provide logistical or other
support to their own nationals who are planning terrorist acts in the
United States, the U.S. policy of targeting the nationals of such coun-
tries has a rational basis. Moreover, foreign policy grounds might vali-
date taking a hard line against nationals of a particular country. In
contrast, policies that explicitly discriminate on the basis of ethnicity
or religion are inherently more suspect.
Still, the distinction should not be overstated. First, almost all the
countries that the United States has designated as harboring terrorists
are predominantly Arab, Muslim, or both.95 Even if, as it asserts, the
administration’s policy truly is not driven by ethnicity or religion, the
practical impact falls disproportionately on one ethnic and one relig-
ious group. Second, so long as the impact is disproportionate, large
segments of the population will perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the
country-of-nationality distinction is merely a facade for anti-Arab or
anti-Muslim sentiments—or at least that the same action would have
been politically infeasible had other ethnic groups been singled out.
The justiªcations for proªling become even more suspect when
the existence of proªling attributes must be inferred from “appear-
ances” rather than more objective criteria. Yet, as a practical matter,
such determinations become inevitable once ethnicity or religion be-
come acceptable proªling attributes. Thus, the government might
decide to interrogate subclasses of those who “appear” to be either
Muslim or of Arab descent, on the supposition that in each of those
subgroups the number of terrorists is higher than in the general
population. To that end, interrogators might decide to identify Arabs
and Muslims by physical features, clothing, accent, name, neighbor-
hood, place of worship, and any other discernible correlates of eth-
nicity or religion.
Of course, many of the same concerns would still be present, in-
cluding the offensiveness of treating people as suspects based solely
on ethnicity or religion. Now, however, additional problems present
themselves. First, the police can be wrong about the person’s ethnicity
or religion. When they are, the policy causes them to waste time on
individuals whom there is no reason, either individualized or statisti-
cal, to suspect. The national security justiªcations weaken correspond-
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ingly. Second, every police force is comprised of individuals possess-
ing vastly different views and attitudes. Those police ofªcers whose
biases incline them toward harassment of particular ethnic or relig-
ious subgroups would now have an ofªcial excuse.
Yet another obvious variable that directly affects the degree of
harm ºowing from discrimination is the speciªc action taken against
members of the targeted group. Although some might tolerate
proªling when the government simply conducts voluntary interviews
of members of the targeted group, they might not be so amenable to
the government’s employment of proªles as criteria for deportation,
detention, special registration, or heightened visa requirements. Oth-
ers might feel that, while the degree of injustice increases as govern-
ment actions become more onerous, ethnic proªling is unjust even
when the government intrusion is otherwise relatively minor.
III. The Race Convention
Given the preceding background and policy framework, one can
now consider whether the various U.S. immigration-related national
security measures are compatible with the United States’ obligations
under the Race Convention.96 Adopted by resolution of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in 1966, and entering into force as a treaty in 1969, the
Convention reºects the world’s shared understandings that racial dis-
crimination is wrong and that collective international efforts to eradi-
cate it are essential.97 The United States ratiªed the Convention in
1994, but with several signiªcant reservations, understandings, and
declarations.98
After deªning “racial discrimination” in article 1, the Race Con-
vention prescribes several actions that the states parties agree to take
(or refrain from taking) to combat either racial discrimination gener-
ally or particular manifestations of it. The Convention also provides
several means of enforcement, including domestic remedies, an ex-
pectation of dispute resolution by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), and the creation of a body called the Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination (CERD).99
                                                                                                                     
96 See Race Convention, supra note 1, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
97 The Cold War politics that shaped its history are well-described in Gay J. McDougall,
Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 How. L.J. 571, 571–82 (1997).
98 See Henkin Doc. Supp., supra note 1, at 180, 192–93.
99 See Race Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6, 8–16, 22, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 222, 224–32,
236.
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The role of CERD is critical to the Convention’s success. Consist-
ing of eighteen “experts of high moral standing and acknowledged im-
partiality elected by States Parties,”100 CERD is entrusted with several
supervisory functions. It receives and reviews reports submitted by each
of the states parties, detailing the measures they have taken to imple-
ment the Convention.101 It also issues “general recommendations” to
the U.N. General Assembly. Additionally, CERD has the power to re-
ceive complaints by one state party that another state party has violated
the Convention.102 CERD may also receive communications ªled by
individuals or groups against any states parties that declare their recog-
nition of CERD’s competence over individual complaints.103
In the case of the United States, these enforcement mechanisms
have been constrained. The U.S. Senate made ratiªcation subject to a
declaration that “the provisions of the Convention are not self-
executing.”104 Some doubt exists as to the validity of the “non-self-
executing” declaration. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties105 prohibits reservations that are “incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty,” and the Human Rights Committee, the
supervisory body established by the ICCPR,106 has questioned the
compatibility of “non-self-executing” reservations with human rights
treaties.107 If the reservation is invalid, then the Human Rights Com-
mittee’s view is that the state is bound to the treaty without the reser-
vation.108 If the reservation is valid, however, its practical effect under
U.S. domestic law is that U.S. courts have no jurisdiction to hear pri-
vate causes of action arising under the Convention.
Even if domestic enforcement proves unattainable, however, the
United States remains bound by its Convention obligations on the in-
                                                                                                                     
100 Id. art. 8, at 224.
101 Id. art. 9.1, at 224-26.
102 Id. arts. 11–13, at 226–30.
103 Id. art. 14, at 230–32.
104 See U.S. Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [hereinafter U.S. Reservations],
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ternational plane. Although subject to neither nonconsensual dispute
resolution before the ICJ109 nor the individual communications author-
ity of CERD,110 the United States remains subject to the other powers of
CERD. Those include the authority to review U.S. country reports, ªle
reports with the General Assembly, and receive interstate complaints.
Do the national security measures summarized in Section I of this
Article comport with United States obligations under the Race Conven-
tion? As will be seen, most of the critical Convention provisions refer to
state obligations that relate to “racial discrimination.” The starting
point therefore, is article 1.1, which deªnes that term to mean:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, en-
joyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cul-
tural or any other ªeld of public life.111
As applied to the recent U.S. national security initiatives that operate
speciªcally on non-U.S. citizens, this deªnition of “racial discrimina-
tion” gives rise to two sets of broad issues. First, do the actions of the
United States truly embody distinctions based on “national or ethnic
origin?”112 Second, do they—and, to be covered by the Convention,
must they—implicate “human rights and fundamental freedoms?”113
The following commentary attempts only to identify and synthesize
possible strategies for assessing United States compliance with the
Race Convention, not to offer deªnitive solutions.
A. “National or Ethnic Origin” Distinctions
One could construct at least three theories for characterizing
some of the immigration-related national security programs as resting
on “national or ethnic origin” distinctions for purposes of article 1.1
of the Convention. For some programs, one might theorize that the
statute, regulation, agency policy, or actual practice expressly and fa-
                                                                                                                     
109 See Reservation No. 3, reprinted in Henkin Doc. Supp., supra note 1, at 192 (detail-
ing the U.S. Senate ratiªcation’s inclusion of an additional reservation which disavowed
the article 22 provision for compulsory ICJ jurisdiction).
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112 Id. art. 1.1, at 216.
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cially embodies such distinctions. Other programs, while facially neu-
tral with respect to nationality and ethnicity, might be claimed to be
purposeful pretexts for nationality- or ethnicity-based enforcement.
Still other programs, although neither expressly nor pretextually in-
tended to distinguish by nationality or ethnicity, might nonetheless
have the “effect” of doing so within the meaning of article 1.1. Of
course, there might be programs for which all, some, or none of these
three arguments are possible.
With respect to express intentional distinctions based on “na-
tional or ethnic origin,” articles 1.2 and 1.3 are instructive. Article 1.2
sets out the commonsense proposition that a state does not engage in
“national or ethnic origin” discrimination simply by treating its own
nationals more favorably than those of other states. Indeed, if it were
otherwise, virtually all nationality classiªcations, including all immi-
gration laws, would be prohibited—a proposition one can safely as-
sume the States Parties did not intend to adopt.114
Article 1.3, however, says “nothing in this Convention may be in-
terpreted as affecting [states’ provisions on nationality], provided that
such provisions do not discriminate against any particular national-
ity.”115 CERD has conªrmed that article 1.3 was meant to qualify arti-
cle 1.2.116
As Section I demonstrated, however, many of the post-September
11 national security initiatives do precisely what article 1.3 warns
against; they single out nationals of selected countries (generally,
                                                                                                                     
114 While article 1.2 makes clear that nothing in the Convention may be read to pro-
hibit all distinctions between citizens and noncitizens, such distinctions might well be pro-
hibited in particular cases. For example, in Habassi v. Denmark, a Danish bank adopted the
practice of denying loans to all non-Danish citizens, even if the applicants were lawful
permanent residents of Denmark. Case No. 10/1997, Views adopted on 17 March 1999,
CERD/C/54/D/10/1997, available at http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/101_denmarkcerdvws
10.pdf. The bank sought to justify the policy as a means of ensuring repayment. Finding
that for repayment purposes permanent residence would be a more logical criterion than
citizenship, CERD held that the Danish authorities should have investigated the “real rea-
sons” for the bank’s policy. Id. ¶ 9.3. That holding would have been impossible if CERD had
believed that article 1.2 insulated all citizen/noncitizen distinctions from protection under
the Race Convention. Nonetheless, since the national security programs examined in this
Article tend to be part and parcel of the U.S. immigration laws, and since by their nature
immigration laws restrict only the movements of noncitizens, the citizen/noncitizen distinc-
tion employed by these U.S. programs should not generate the same difªculties as the Dan-
ish bank’s loan policies. Rather, of chief concern here are those distinctions between nation-
als of some foreign states and nationals of others.
115 Race Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 216 (emphasis added).
116 See Gen. Rec. XI on Non-citizens, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 112–13, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993).
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countries predesignated as linked to terrorism) for special, additional
restrictions, some substantive and others procedural. Does article 1.3
suggest that such measures constitute “national origin” distinctions?
And if so, what is the fate of the many other U.S. immigration provi-
sions mentioned earlier that provide for the special treatment of na-
tionals of speciªc countries, outside the national security context?117
Does article 1.3 prohibit them as well?
Such a conclusion is hard to imagine, for states commonly enter
into free or preferential travel pacts, as well as other immigration ar-
rangements with particular neighboring states, former colonies, and
important trading partners. The European Union and other regional
associations see nothing wrong in making special arrangements for
fellow members of their associations. Surely, states with such extensive
commitments did not agree to a convention that would render all
preferential arrangements illegal.
It is true that the national security programs discussed in Section I
tend to make adverse treatment exceptional, in contrast to the other
cited examples in which favorable treatment is the exception. But there
is no apparent policy reason that the validity of distinctions between
nationals of some foreign states and nationals of others should hinge
on whether the favored states are a majority or a minority. In each case,
nationals of some states are treated more favorably than similarly-
situated nationals of other states. Either the Convention permits that
practice, one would think, or it does not.
My view is that the cleanest and most sensible way to analyze this
problem is to give article 1.3 its literal meaning. If a nationality law does
“not discriminate against any particular nationality,” then article 1.3
makes clear that nothing in the Convention prohibits such a law.118 But
the converse is not implied; the fact that a nationality law does discrimi-
nate against a particular nationality does not necessarily mean the law
violates the Convention. It means only that other considerations be-
come relevant. For instance, even if one ªnds the distinction to be
based on “national origin” within the meaning of article 1.1, one must
ask whether it impairs a human right or fundamental freedom. If so,
does sufªcient countervailing justiªcation exist? Conversely, even if the
distinction is found not to be based on national origin, might it be a
pretext for distinguishing according to ethnic origin? Or might its effect
be so ethnically disparate that the law violates the Convention?
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While the preceding discussion focuses on laws,  regulations, and
other ofªcial departmental policies that expressly differentiate based
on national or ethnic origin, express discrimination would also violate
the Convention if effected by the individual agents or employees im-
plementing the general laws or policies. That much is evident from
article 1.1, which makes no attempt to distinguish between those who
discriminate in forming a broadly applicable policy and those who
discriminate in carrying it out.119 Thus, even facially neutral U.S. im-
migration enforcement programs would violate article 1.1 if it could
be shown that in practice government agents seek out suspects ac-
cording to ethnic origin.120
A second theory—or, more accurately, a second species of inten-
tional discrimination—is that a facially neutral policy is a pretext for
national or ethnic origin discrimination. When that is the case, then
no obvious legal issue exists, other than possibly the question of
whether the particular individual interest rises to the level of a human
right or fundamental freedom. The only real question would be fac-
tual: whether there is persuasive evidence of pretext.
In the present context, this theory could surface in either of two
ways. First, many of the national security programs discussed in Section
I expressly prescribe adverse treatment for nationals of selected states.
Even if those distinctions are not themselves characterized as “national
origin” distinctions, they might be found to be pretexts for ethnic origin
distinctions. Second, even those national security programs that are
facially neutral with respect to country of nationality might be found to
be pretexts for national or ethnic origin discrimination if the ofªcials
who formulated the programs anticipated that enforcement personnel
would in fact apply the requirements more vigorously to individuals of
particular national or ethnic origin. In either case, the question would
be one of fact, and the burden would be to establish a hidden motive
for the policy or the enforcement practice.
In a given case, a good starting point for establishing pretext
would be a showing that the stated justiªcation does not withstand
serious scrutiny. In Habassi v. Denmark,121 CERD held that in that event
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it is “appropriate to initiate a proper investigation into the real rea-
sons behind the . . . policy.”122
A third theory for challenging many of the U.S. proªling strate-
gies—and perhaps even those that do not ofªcially rely on proªling—
is based on disparate impact. As noted earlier, the Convention’s
deªnition of “racial discrimination” includes national or ethnic origin
distinctions that have either the purpose or the “effect” of impairing
the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal
footing.123 CERD has made clear that the test for “effect” is “whether
that action has an unjustiªable disparate impact upon a group distin-
guished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.”124
Thus far, CERD has provided little guidance as to the standard that
“unjustiªable” demands. On the one hand, even a legitimate motive
can leave a disparate impact unjustiªed. In considering a country re-
port ªled by Denmark, CERD disapproved of the Danish policy of bus-
sing non-Danish-speaking schoolchildren to special reception classes
when the “effect” is discriminatory, even though CERD acknowledged
that it “understands the reasons.”125 On the other hand, in reviewing
Australia’s policy of administering additional medical exams to gradu-
ates (Australian or otherwise) of foreign medical schools, CERD found
no discriminatory effect, even though the pass rates varied considerably
from one foreign country of birth to another.126
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and at the request of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, CERD issued an ofªcial
statement on the general subject of discrimination in the context of
the war on terror.127 Condemning the terrorist attacks “unequivo-
cally,” CERD emphasized that counter-terrorism measures must none-
theless respect international human rights law, that the prohibition
on racial discrimination is a peremptory—and thus, non-derogable—
norm, and that states must ensure that their counter-terrorism pro-
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cerdvws10.pdf.
123 Race Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.1, 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
124 Gen. Rec. XI on Non-citizens, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 114, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993).
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grams do “not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of . . .
national or ethnic origin.”128
This is vague language indeed, and the question is how to apply it
to the recent spate of U.S. counter-terrorism strategies that operate in
the immigration arena. Certainly, if the implementation of any of the
policies can be shown to target Muslims, then a disparate effect on
noncitizens of Arab descent would follow and would arguably consti-
tute ethnic origin discrimination.129 Similarly, even the programs that
single out either nationals or natives of countries thought to support
terrorism are likely to have a disparate “effect” on individuals of Arab
ethnic origin. Whether they violate the Race Convention again re-
quires an assessment of whether they are “justiªable.” Finally, even the
facially neutral programs might have unjustiªable and disparate ef-
fects if they leave the enforcement ofªcials with impermissibly broad
discretion that promotes discriminatory enforcement. CERD ex-
pressed just such a concern over French policies that gave police
ofªcers broad discretion to check the identities of foreigners in pub-
lic, a practice that CERD feared could foster discrimination.130
B. “Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”
Even when the particular national security strategy is ultimately
characterized as embodying distinctions based on “race, colour, de-
scent, or national or ethnic origin,” the deªnition of “racial discrimi-
nation” in article 1.1 additionally requires the impairment of “human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”131 That qualiªer distinguishes ar-
ticle 1.1 from a general equal protection clause, where protection
does not require a showing that the interest being selectively denied
rises to any particular level. Since article 1.1 deªnes “racial discrimi-
nation” in this limited manner, other provisions of the Convention
that refer to that language are correspondingly restricted.132 One such
restricted provision is article 2, which obligates states parties to elimi-
nate racial discrimination and to refrain from engaging in it.
Article 5 reads:
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In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down
in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to
prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without dis-
tinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the fol-
lowing rights . . . .133
The provision then goes on to list various rights, some of which are
discussed below.
One uncertainty is whether the second prong of article 5 (“and to
guarantee the right of everyone”), like the ªrst (“undertake to prohibit
and to eliminate racial discrimination”), is qualiªed by the introduc-
tory phrase referring to “obligations laid down in article 2.”134 If yes,
then both prongs of article 5 are conªned to distinctions that impair
human rights and fundamental freedoms, because article 2 is expressly
limited to addressing “racial discrimination” as deªned in article 1.135 If
no, then article 5 ushers in a broad equal protection guarantee, one
that prohibits unjustiªable discrimination based on “race, colour, or
national or ethnic origin” even when internationally recognized human
rights or fundamental freedoms are not otherwise at stake.
The choice of interpretations could have implications for the
U.S. national security initiatives discussed earlier.136 As noted previ-
ously, some of the programs affect such important human rights as
family uniªcation, freedom from arbitrary detention, asylum from
persecution, and the like, while others affect only lesser interests.137
The arguments favoring the narrower reading of article 5 are
substantial. After the opening qualiªer, the subject “States Parties”
appears only once and the two prongs that follow it are not separated
by a comma or other punctuation. Therefore, a literal grammatical
reading leaves the opening qualiªer applicable to both prongs.
Moreover, if the second prong of article 5 were read as a general
equal protection clause, there would have been no point in conªning
the racial discrimination deªnition in article 1 to distinctions that im-
pair human rights and fundamental freedoms and then conªning ar-
ticles 2 through 7 to situations embraced by that term; in any case in
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2005] The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens 195
which a lesser substantive interest was at risk, article 5 would make
that limitation superºuous.
But if that is the case, then what is the point of article 5? The
most likely explanation is that by listing examples of rights that can-
not be denied selectively, and by strategically using the word “nota-
bly,” article 5 supplies a non-exhaustive catalog of the kinds of human
rights and fundamental freedoms envisioned by the deªnition of ra-
cial discrimination.138 This interpretation ªnds support in CERD’s
General Recommendation XX, handed down in 1996. There CERD
noted that many of the rights listed in article 5 emanate from other
international human rights instruments and that the listed rights “do
not constitute an exhaustive list.”139
A brief glance at the rights enumerated in article 5 reveals the
breadth of individual interests which the Convention regards as wor-
thy of protection from discrimination. An impressive array of rights is
covered, ranging from the civil and political to the economic, social,
and cultural. The ªrst ones listed—“freedom of movement and resi-
dence within the borders of the State”—are directly relevant.140 They
correspond, respectively, to those U.S. national security strategies that
entail preventive detention and loss of procedural safeguards in the
removal process.
CERD, reviewing a French country report in 1994, has reinforced
that view. In an apparent reference to article 1.1 of the Convention,
CERD expressed concern that a recently enacted French immigration
law “could have racially discriminatory consequences,” because it re-
stricted the right to appeal expulsion orders and prescribed preven-
tive detention for “excessively long periods.”141 The report also voiced
concern over “procedures concerning identity controls” that allowed
broad police discretion, expressing the fear that such unrestrained
discretion could promote discrimination.142 To describe the feared
consequences as discrimination prohibited by the Convention, how-
ever, CERD must have regarded the police checks of foreigners’ iden-
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tities as implicating “human rights or fundamental freedoms.” If that
is the case, then several of the U.S. intelligence-gathering strategies,
even as applied to non-U.S. citizens, are also potentially vulnerable to
challenges under articles 1.1 or 5.
Conclusion
The United States has responded to the threat of international
terrorism in controversial ways. Some U.S. counter-terrorism strate-
gies have entailed one form or another of ethnic or religious
proªling. While this package of responses cannot be dismissed as in-
herently irrational, many of the speciªc proªling programs carry so-
cial costs that this Article ªnds excessive in relation to any law en-
forcement gains they might be thought to yield. Perhaps more
signiªcantly, the various proªling programs have international human
rights implications, raising serious questions of compatibility with U.S.
obligations under the Race Convention.
